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The aim of this paper is to investigate whether return migrants are more likely to become 
entrepreneurs than non-migrants. We develop a theoretical search model that puts forward 
the trade off faced by returnees since overseas migration provides an opportunity for human 
and physical capital accumulation but, at the same time, may lead to a loss of social capital 
back home. We test the predictions of the model using data from Egypt. We find that, even 
after controlling for the endogeneity of the temporary migration decision, an overseas 
returnee is more likely to become an entrepreneur than a non-migrant. Although migrants 
lose their original social networks whilst overseas, savings and human capital accumulation 
acquired abroad over-compensate for this loss. Our results also suggest that social networks 
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What makes an entrepreneur? This question has been the focus of few previous studies which
have tried to understand the determinants of self-employment in developed countries (see,
for example, Blanchﬂower and Oswald, 1998; Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; and Evans and
Leighton, 1989). Yet, very few studies have attempted to study this question for developing
countries. Meanwhile, the wealth and poverty of developing countries are linked to the
entrepreneurial nature of their economies. Entrepreneurship plays an important role in
economic growth, innovation, and competitiveness as ﬁrst highlighted by Schumpeter in 1911
(see Schumpeter, 1934) and it may also play a role in poverty alleviation (Landes, 1998). It
is thus important to understand what makes an entrepreneur in developing countries.
The rather small literature on entrepreneurship in developing countries has put forward
the importance of ﬁnancial constraints in becoming an entrepreneur. Access to credit is
seen as a major obstacle for entrepreneurship. Limited personal and family savings and
lack of access to credit are seen to severely limit the growth prospects of promising startups
in developing countries. Thus, policy makers and international organizations interested in
economic development have supported micro-credit programs in developing countries as a
means to encourage entrepreneurship. More recently, international migration has played an
important role in allowing this liquidity constraint to be overcomed. Temporary migration
has been a conduit through which individuals are able to have the opportunity to accumulate
savings, which can be used upon their return for setting up businesses.
Several studies have been interested in how international migration provides a channel for
accessing credit through overseas savings and focused on the impact of savings on the occu-
pational choice of returnees and in particular on self-employment and entrepreneurship. Ilahi
(1999), using cross-sectional data from Pakistan, ﬁnds that upon return, savings become a
signiﬁcant factor in the choice of self-employment over waged employment. Mesnard (2004)
models migration as a way to overcome credit constraints in the presence of capital markets
imperfections. She ﬁnds that the majority of entrepreneurial projects started by Tunisian
returnees were totally ﬁnanced through overseas savings.1 Dustmann and Kirchkamp (2002)
develop a model where migrants decide simultaneously on the optimal migration duration
and their after return activities. They ﬁnd that among Turkish returnees more than half
1In another paper, Mesnard and Ravaillon (2006) examine not only the eﬀect of credit constraints (wealth)
but also wealth inequality among return migrants in Tunisia.
2of them are economically active and most of them engage in entrepreneurial activities. Mc-
Cormick and Wahba (2001) add a diﬀerent insight by showing that savings matter more
than human capital acquisition for the probability of entrepreneurship of illiterate Egyptian
returnees. However, for the educated returnees, both access to credit, through overseas sav-
ings, and human capital accumulation are signiﬁcant determinants of entrepreneurship upon
return. Woodruﬀ and Zenteno (2007) ﬁnd that migration networks help to overcome capital
constraints in Mexico. Using a survey of self-employed workers and small ﬁrm owners in
Mexico that have access to remittance ﬂows, they estimate the impact of attachment to
migration networks on the level of capital investment, the capital—output ratio, sales, and
proﬁts of microenterprises. However all of those studies limit their analysis to only return
migrants, whilst Woodruﬀ and Zenteno (2007) consider households of migrants receiving
remittances rather than return migrants. Yet, one important question is whether return
migrants are more likely than non-migrants to become entrepreneurs. Temporary migration
might enable individuals to accumulate human and physical capital thereby increasing their
potential of becoming entrepreneurs. The issue of whether return migrants are more or less
likely to become entrepreneur has not been addressed before.
In addition, although physical capital is an important determinant of entrepreneurship
and has been seen as an important factor by economists, there are potentially other factors
that may impact on the individual’s decision of setting up a business. Sociologists have
stressed the importance of social capital as a determinant of entrepreneurship: entrepreneurs
rely on their contacts for information and services (see, e.g., Greve and Salaﬀ, 2003). This
is an issue that has not really been focused on by economists. Indeed, several economic
studies have examined the role of social networks in migration in developing countries (see
e.g. Munshi, 2003; McKenzie and Rapoport, 2009) and others have studied the role of social
networks in job acquisition (see e.g. Wahba and Zenou, 2005). All of this literature has
focused on the role played by social networks in the migration decision through reducing
migration cost for example and in ﬁnding jobs upon arrival in the host country. However,
t h er o l ep l a y e db yt h eorigin social networks in entrepreneurship has attracted very little
previous attention. Moreover, no one has examined the possible loss of social capital at the
country of origin as a result of emigration and whether this impacts on the entrepreneurial
decision upon return.
The aim of this paper is to study what makes an entrepreneur in Egypt and address
3the following questions. Are return migrants more likely to become entrepreneurs than non-
migrants? Does emigration result in loss of social capital, hence out of sight, out of mind,
and thus aﬀect the entrepreneurship decision negatively? Thus, this paper attempts to
address this important policy question regarding the determinants of entrepreneurship and
whether return migrants are more likely to become entrepreneurs compared to non-migrants.
This should impact on policies directed towards encouraging entrepreneurship and providing
micro-credit in many developing countries.
To answer the above questions, one needs to control for the potential endogeneity of
the temporary migration decision and the entrepreneurial decision upon return. On the
one hand migration might increase the probability of entrepreneurship, but it could be that
individuals planning to be an entrepreneur are more likely to migrate. First, we develop
a theoretical search model where we endogenize the temporary migration and the entre-
preneurship decisions and show the trade oﬀ faced by returnees since overseas migration
provides an opportunity for human and physical capital accumulation but, at the same time,
may lead to a loss of social capital back home. Then, we test the predictions of the model
using the Egyptian Labour Market Survey in 1998 by looking at both overseas returnees
and non-migrants. We control for the potential endogeneity between migration and entre-
preneurship. We ﬁnd that controlling for the return migration decision, a returnee is more
likely to become an entrepreneur than a non-migrant. Although migrants lose social net-
works back home whilst abroad, savings and human capital accumulation acquired overseas
over compensate for this loss.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical model. In section 3
we describe the data, whilst the econometric model is presented in section 4. The empirical
ﬁndings are examined in Section 5 and further robustness checks are discussed in this section.
Section 6 concludes.
2T h e o r y
Consider a continuum of individuals whose mass is n in a given country (Egypt in the data).
There are two types of individuals who can either be a returnee (i.e. someone who has
migrated to another country and came back) or a non-migrant (i.e. someone who has never
emigrated overseas). An individual i is identiﬁed with the subscript i = re in the former
4case and i = nm in the latter. The mass of returnees and non-migrants are denoted by nre
and nnm,w i t hnre + nnm = n. Each individual i = re,nm c a ne i t h e rb ea ne n t r e p r e n e u ro r
a worker but not both. If individual i decides to become an entrepreneur, then he/she can
create and manage αi jobs. In our model, αi also represents the capacity of individual i of
becoming an entrepreneur. We assume that:
αi = tH i + Si (1)
where t is the innate entrepreneurship talent of an individual, Hi captures both the human
and physical capitals of individual i,a n dSi is the size and quality of his/her origin social
network. In other words, this formulation (1) captures the fact that what matters to be an
entrepreneur for individual i is his/her human and physical capitals Hi as well as the size
and quality of his/her social network Si. First, the innate entrepreneurship talent is not
indexed by i since people are born with it and does not depend on any migration decision.





. We assume that returnees and non-migrants are born with exactly the same
exogenous ability t. Second, because returnees have accumulated human capital and savings
(physical capital) through their experience abroad, it is assumed that Hre >H nm.T h i r d ,Si
is capturing the social network that individuals have, an important feature of the Egyptian
labor market (Wahba and Zenou, 2005). Si captures both the number and the quality (i.e.
human capital, connections, etc.) of the social network.2 We assume that Snm >S re,
which captures the idea that people who migrate lose part of their social network. This is a
reasonable assumption since a person who has left a country for say four or ﬁv ey e a r si sl e s s
likely to keep all his/her social contacts compared to someone who has not migrated.3
In this model, once an individual i has decided to become an entrepreneur or a worker,
then there is no diﬀerence between returnees and non-migrants in terms of productivity,
wages, etc. Having migrated or not only changes the αi, the capacity of becoming entrepre-
2We do not model explicitly the social network as, for example, in Calv´ o-Armengol and Jackson (2004)
because we do not have this information in our dataset.
3In a previous version of this paper, we diﬀerentiated between strong and weak ties, assuming that
migrants lose their weak ties but not their strong ties when leaving the country. Since we do not have
information on weak and strong ties in our dataset, weh a v eh e r ef o c u s e do n l yo nt h es i z ea n dq u a l i t yo f
the network, assuming that the size reduces when someone live a country (which could be interpreted as the
fact that the migrant mainly loses his/her weak ties).
5neur but then, once a decision has been made, all individuals are assumed to be identical.4
Apart from the initial talent t, there is a second dimension of heterogeneity for individuals.
We assume that individuals have diﬀerent migration costs c. The migration cost c is drawn
from a cumulative distribution G(c), which is continuous on the support interval [c,c]. We
assume that there are no correlations between F(t)a n dG(c)s ot h a t ,f o re x a m p l e ,av e r y
talented person may have a very high migration cost because he/she has a large family.5
T h et i m i n go ft h em o d e li sa sf o l l o w s . I nt h eﬁrst stage, each individual of type (t,c)
has to decide whether to migrate or not. After the ﬁrst stage, the individual becomes of
type re if he/she has migrated and returned to the home country and of type nm if he/she
has stayed home. Then, in the second stage, each individual of type (i,t) has to decide to
become an entrepreneur or a waged worker. As usual, we solve this game backwards and
thus we start by solving the second stage.
2.1 Second stage: The decision of becoming an entrepreneur
We use a standard search-matching model (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999; Pissarides, 2000)
to describe the labor market.
Matching function A ﬁrm (created by an entrepreneur) is a unit of production that
can either be ﬁlled by a worker whose production is y units of output or be unﬁlled and thus
unproductive. In order to ﬁnd a worker, a ﬁrm posts a vacancy. A vacancy can be ﬁlled
according to a random Poisson process. Similarly, workers searching for a job will ﬁnd one
according to a random Poisson process. As a result, at any moment of time, there will be
m+v jobs, with m of them occupied by workers and v of them vacant, and m+u workers,
m of them employed and u of them unemployed. In aggregate, these processes imply that
there is a number of contacts per unit of time between the two sides of the market that are
determined by the following matching function:
4Fonseca et al. (2001) model the capacity of individual i of becoming an entrepreneur in a similar way
but do not have social networks and do not model the migration decision.
5We could assume that these two distributions are correlated in some way. This would make the analysis
easier but also less interesting.
6M = M(m + u,m + v)( 2 )
As in the standard search-matching model (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999, and Pissarides,
2000), we assume that M is increasing both in its arguments, concave and homogeneous of
degree 1 (or equivalently has constant return to scale). Given the matching function (2),
we can determine the rate at which vacancies are ﬁlled. It is equal to: M(m + u,m +
v)/(m + v) ≡ q(θ)w h e r eθ ≡ (m + v)/(m + u)i st h elabor market tightness.B yu s i n gt h e
properties of M,i ti se a s i l yv e r i ﬁed that q0(θ) ≤ 0: the higher the labor market tightness, the
lower the rate at which ﬁrm ﬁll their vacancy. Similarly, the rate at which an unemployed
worker leaves unemployment is M(m + u,m + v)/(m + u) ≡ θq(θ). Again, by using the
properties of M, it is easily veriﬁed that [θq(θ)]
0 ≥ 0: the higher the labor market tightness,
the higher the rate at which workers leave unemployment since there are relatively more jobs
than unemployed workers. Finally, the rate at which jobs are destroyed is exogenous and
denoted by δ.
Expected utilities and wages Agents discount the future at rate r, are risk neutral,
have rational expectations and live inﬁnitely. In steady-state, the discounted expected utility
of employed and unemployed workers are respectively given by:6
rIL = wL − δ(IL − IU)( 3 )
rIU = wU + θq(θ)(IL − IU)( 4 )
with
IL − IU =
wL − wU
r + δ + θq(θ)
(5)
By plugging (5) into (3) and (4), we ﬁnally get:
rIL =
δwU +[ r + θq(θ)]wL
r + δ + θq(θ)
(6)
6IL and IU are the steady-state expected utilities of employed and unemployed workers who have decided
not to become entrepreneurs. These are the waged workers.
7rIU =
(r + δ)wU + θq(θ)wL
r + δ + θq(θ)
(7)
Let us denote by IF and IV the intertemporal proﬁt of an entrepreneur with a ﬁlled job
and a vacancy, respectively. If γ is the search cost for the ﬁrm per unit of time and y is the
product of a match, then, at the steady-state, IF and IV can be written as:
rIF = y − wL − δ(IF − IV)( 8 )
rIV = −γ + q(θ)(IF − IV)( 9 )
which implies that:
IF − IV =
y − wL + c
r + δ + q(θ)
(10)
By plugging (10) into (8) and (9), we obtain:
rIF =
[r + q(θ)](y − wL) − δγ
r + δ + q(θ)
rIV =
q(θ)(y − wL) − (r + δ)γ
r + δ + q(θ)
(11)
Let us now determine the wage. At each period, the total intertemporal surplus is shared
through a generalized Nash-bargaining process between the ﬁrm (i.e. the entrepreneur) and
the (waged) worker. The total surplus is the sum of the surplus of the workers, IL −IU,a n d
the surplus of the ﬁrms IF − IV. At each period, the wage is determined by:





where 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 represents the bargaining power of workers. By solving (12), we obtain the
following sharing rule:
(1 − β)(IL − IU)=β (IF − IV)
Using (3) and (8), this can be written as:




and the wage is ﬁnally given by:
8wL =( 1− β)wU + β [y + γθ+( θ − 1)rIV]( 1 3 )
Plugging the wage wL (13) into (11), we obtain:
rIV =
(1 − β)q(θ)(y − wU) − [r + δ + βθq(θ)]γ
(1 − β)q(θ)+r + δ + βθq(θ)
(14)
We can also calculate rIU in a similar way and we obtain:




(1 − β)θq(θ)(y − wU + γ)
(1 − β)q(θ)+r + δ + βθq(θ)
(15)































Occupational choice I nt h es e c o n ds t a g e ,t h et y p ei = re,nm has already been
decided in the ﬁrst stage, and thus each individual i has now to decide whether or not to
become an entrepreneur. There is a start-up cost of a new company, which is denoted by K.
If individual i becomes an entrepreneur, ex ante he/she will get αiIV −K while the expected
utility from being a worker is IU.7 Hence, individual i becomes an entrepreneur if and only
if:
αiIV − K ≥ IU









such that all individuals with t ≥ e ti will be entrepreneurs while the others will be workers.
As a result, F(e ti) will be workers of type i and 1 − F(e ti) will be entrepreneurs of type i.
7Indeed, this person is still unemployed when he/she makes the entrepreneur decision. If he/she decides
to become a worker, he/she will go to the labor market as an unemployed worker and look for a job.
9Equation (16) is the job creation equation that gives a relationship between e ti and θ.I nt h e








which implies that (16) deﬁnes a positive relationship between e ti and θ. Indeed, when the
labor-market tightness θ increases, it is easier for people to ﬁnd jobs (since θq(θ)i n c r e a s e s )
and thus they prefer to work rather than to be entrepreneur. As a result, e ti increases, which
reduces the fraction of entrepreneurs of both types in the economy since θ aﬀects the same





IV the productivity elasticity of the utility of the unemployed and
















Denote also by ηδ
IU and ηδ
IV the job destruction elasticity of the utility of the unemployed
















We have the following results:
Proposition 1 Returnees are more likely to be entrepreneur than non-migrants,
(i) the higher is Hre/Hnm, the ratio of the human and physical capitals of returnees and
non-migrants;
(ii) the lower is Snm (the size of the social network of non-migrants) and/or the higher is
Sre (the size of the social network of returnees);
(iii) the higher is the start-up cost K, the labor-market tightness θ, the unemployment beneﬁt
wU, and/or the cost of creating a single job γ;








102.2 First stage: The migration decision
Let us now solve the ﬁrst stage, i.e. the migration decision. In the model, as it is the case in
our data for Egypt (see below), we are only focussing on temporary migration,w h i c hm e a n s
that when an individual decides to migrate, he/she know with certainty that he/she will
return to the home country.8 In this context, individuals will make a migration decision
anticipating the second stage (i.e. the decision to become entrepreneur as a returnee or
non-migrant). It should be clear that, whatever the migration cost c,i fs o m e o n ei ss u r enot




,t h e nh e / s h e
will never migrate because we have assumed that the beneﬁts of migrating is to increase the
human capital speciﬁc to entrepreneurship (see equation (1)).9 As a result, the only persons
who want to migrate are the ones who are sure to become entrepreneur and are thus ready
to pay the two costs associated with migration, that is the migration cost c and the loss of
social network (which is Snm−Sre), in order to gain Hre−Hnm. We thus need to determine





We need to solve the following equation:
−e c + αreIV = αnmIV
This equation gives the value of e c that makes an individual indiﬀerent between being an
entrepreneur returnee and a non-migrant entrepreneur. This equation can be written as:
e c =( αre − αnm)IV
This is very intuitive since it says that for an individual to be indiﬀerent between being an
entrepreneur returnee and a non-migrant entrepreneur, it has to be that the cost of migrating
is exactly equal to the beneﬁt of migrating, which is αre − αnm for an entrepreneur. Using
(1), this equation is given by:
e c =[ t (Hre − Hnm) − (Snm − Sre)]IV (17)
We have the following proposition:
8Over 90 percent of Egyptian migration is temporary in nature.
9This could be relaxed by assuming that the instantaneous utility of an employed worker is wL + Hi
instead of wL as in (3). This would make the wage of workers wL (13) a positive function of Hi.A sar e s u l t ,
because Hre >H nm, some individuals would decide to migrate and become waged workers when coming
back home. We have performed this exercise and the results do not change much even though the analysis
is more cumbersome. These results are available upon request.
11Proposition 2
















(ib) If e tnm > e tre, then all of them will become waged workers.





(iia) If e tnm ≤ e tre, then all of them will become waged workers.














will migrate and all of
them will become entrepreneurs when coming back home.
What is interesting for the empirical analysis is under which condition(s) these diﬀerent
cases arise.
Proposition 3
(i) The lower the human capital and physical capital (i.e., savings) returns from migration
are (i.e. the smaller is Hre −Hnm), the higher the losses in social capital are (i.e. the
higher is Snm − Sre), and/or the more the labor market at home is booming (i.e. θ, y,
wU have low values and δ is high), the less likely workers will migrate.
(ii) If we have the contrary, i.e., high Hre − Hnm,l o wSnm − Sre,a n d / o rθ, y, wU have
high values and δ is low, then a fraction of workers will migrate and all of them will
become entrepreneurs when returning home.
122.3 Closing the model
Job creation and steady-state equilibrium Let us close the model. First, let us
determine the number of jobs created in this economy. Each entrepreneur i = re,nm of
type t creates αi = tH i + Si jobs, i.e. entrepreneurs create jobs up to the maximum they
can manage. Hence, the total number of (ﬁlled and unﬁlled jobs) jobs created by returnee































[tH re + Sre] f(t)dt (18)




[tH nm + Snm] f(t)dt (19)
As a result, the total number of (ﬁlled and unﬁlled) jobs created in the economy is given by:




[tH re + Sre] f(t)dt +
Z t
h tnm
[tH nm + Snm] f(t)dt (20)
Let us now determined the number of workers in the economy. We assumed that there are
n workers with n = nre + nnm.I fw ed e n o t eb yu the total number of unemployed workers
(which include both types), we have:
n = F(e tre)+F(e tnm)+u = m + u (21)
since F(e ti) are the number of employed workers of type i in the economy, which, in equi-
librium, has to be equal to m, the number of jobs occupied. Combining (20) and (21),
m = n − u = ∆re + ∆nm − v, which, by using the fact that F(e ti)=
R h ti
t f(t)dt,i se q u i v a l e n t
to:










[tH re + Sre] f(t)dt +
Z t
h tnm
[tH nm + Snm] f(t)dt − v
13Observe that, even if returnee and non-migrant entrepreneurs do not create the same number
of jobs, the jobs are exactly the same (in terms of wage, productivity) so that workers of
any type are indiﬀerent between working in any job. This is why the matching function is
written as in (2) and the labor market tightness is equal to θ ≡ (m + v)/(m + u).
W en o wn e e da ne q u a t i o nt h a td e t e r m i n e st h eﬂows in the labor market. The evolution
of employment in terms of the ﬁrm’s transition rates is:
•
m = vq(θ) − mδ





[tH re + Sre] f(t)dt +
Z t
h tnm
[tH nm + Snm] f(t)dt − m
#
q(θ) − mδ (22)
The evolution of employment in terms of the worker’s transition rates is:
•
m = uθq(θ) − (n − u)δ
which, using (21), is equivalent to:
•
m =( n − m)θq(θ) − mδ
=
£





m = 0, and (22) and (23) are given by:
Z t
h tre
[tH re + Sre] f(t)dt +
Z t
h tnm









By combining these two equations, we obtain:
Z t
h tre
[tH re + Sre] f(t)dt +
Z t
h tnm




The equilibrium is now easy to calculate. There are three equations: (16) for e tre,( 1 6 )
for e tnm, and (23), and three unknowns: e tre, e tnm,a n dθ. It can be shown that a unique
equilibrium exists.
14W ew o u l dl i k et ot e s tP r o p o s i t i o n s1 ,2a n d3 ,i . e .w h a ti n ﬂuences the choice of becoming
an entrepreneur for a returnee and a non-migrant and the choice of migration. In partic-
ular, we would like to answer the following questions: Who is more likely to become an
entrepreneur? A returnee or a non-migrant? Which variables aﬀect this choice?
The general idea of the model is that overseas temporary migration provides an oppor-
tunity for human and physical capital accumulation but, at the same time, may lead to loss
of social capital back home. We have shown in our theoretical analysis that there may be a
trade oﬀ between those two factors.
3 The data
To test this idea, we will use data from a rich survey: Egypt Labor Market Survey 1998
(ELMS1998) carried out by the Central Agency of Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAP-
MAS) in Egypt. The ELMS 1998 is nationally-representative household survey that gathered
data on a wide range of labor market variables at the household and individual level cover-
ing 5,000 households. Each data set is comprised of three questionnaires: 1) the household
questionnaire; 2) the individual questionnaire; 3) the family enterprise questionnaire. Each
household has at least one household questionnaire and one individual questionnaire. If any
of the members of the household was self-employed or an employer, a family enterprise ques-
tionnaire for this household was administrated. Data for the household questionnaire was
collected from the head of the household and included the roster of members of the household,
each individual’s relationship to the head of the household and demographic characteristics
of the household. The individual questionnaire applies to individuals six years old and above.
A battery of individual modules was designed to collect data on individual characteristics,
employment characteristics, unemployment, mobility and career history, and earnings. Data
for the individual questionnaire were collected from the individual him/herself except for
individuals less than 15 years old. We make use of the economic unit questionnaire which
being part of a household survey gathered information on all economic units and estab-
lishments regardless of ﬁrm size as is common in establishment surveys and thus captured
all employment in the economy not just that occurs within ﬁxed establishments of a cer-
tain size. The economic unit module is extremely valuable in providing detailed picture of
entrepreneurship.
15We deﬁne an entrepreneur as an employer or self employed owner of non-agricultural
economic unit. We adopt this deﬁnition to enable us to study entrepreneurship and business
set up. The analysis in this paper is restricted to males heads of households over 25 years
of age at the time of survey. We observe only returnees i.e. migrants who are currently
overseas are not observed in our survey. This should not be a problem in our context since
the majority, over 90 percent, of Egyptian migration is temporary in nature. Egypt has been
a major labor exporter since the early 70s, exporting both educated and uneducated labor -
with around 10% of the labor force working overseas at any point in time. The majority of
Egyptian migrants go to the Gulf States and to other Arab countries. After the oil boom of
1973, the Gulf oil exporting countries found their development plans constrained by labor
shortages, and embarked on importing large numbers of workers from neighboring countries.
At the peak, the Gulf States were importing 90% of their labor force. Between 1975 and
1995, 5 million foreign workers have migrated to the Gulf States. (See Girgis (2002)) During
the 70s and 80s, Arab neighboring countries were the main labor exporters to the GCC.
Even in the 80s and 90s, when Asians repl a c e dA r a bw o r k e r s ,E g y p t i a n so u t ﬂow of workers
continued though at a lower scale. In the mid 1990s, Egyptian workers were the second
highest concentration of migrants after Indian nationals in Saudi Arabia. The Gulf States
have been a locus of huge inﬂows of migrants given their high demand for overseas labor
and the temporary nature of their contracts. As a consequence, Egypt has a substantial
proportion of return migrants who has worked overseas at one point in time. As noted
by Lucas (2008) that migration to the Gulf States is all temporary in nature with the
mean migration duration of around four to ﬁve years and acquisition of citizenship being
eﬀectively impossible for anyone. Thus, we assume that there is no sample selection issue
related to return migration since almost all emigration from Egypt to Arab Countries has
been temporary in nature.10
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on returnees and non-migrants for the total sample.
Table 1 shows that 35% of returnees are entrepreneurs compared to 30% among non-migrants.
Overall, returnees seem to be younger in age, and more educated relative to non-migrants.
Yet, as Table 1 shows return migrants tend to come from the whole educational spectrum:
14 percent of returnees had no education and 24 % were University graduates. Two thirds
10Around 10 percent of emigration from Egypt was destined to North America and Europe in the 80s and
90s. However, emigrants to those destinations tend to emigrate permanently and move with their families
so are not observed in survey data collected in Egypt.
16of returnees resided originally in urban areas. Almost 22 % of returnees were waged workers
prior to migration compared to 39 percent among non-migrants.
[Insert Table 1 here]
4 Econometric Framework
To test the model’s predictions, we estimate the determinants of entrepreneurship to examine
whether returnees are more or less likely than stayers to become entrepreneurs and the extent
to which there is a trade oﬀ between the loss of social capital and the gain in human and
physical capital as a result of temporary migration if any. To capture the interdependence
between temporary (return) migration and entrepreneurship, we use a bivariate probit model
where the two decisions are interdependent, although we test for this interdependence later.
In addition, one potentially confounding factor is that temporary/return migration and en-
trepreneurship may be endogenously determined decisions. Individuals migrate temporarily
because they plan to become entrepreneurs on their return, whilst on the other hand tem-
porary migration might inﬂuence the occupational choice of returnees and therefore their
prospects of becoming entrepreneurs. To address this endogeneity issue, we use a recursive
bivariate probit model to take care of the endogeneity between the entrepreneurship decision
and the temporary/return migration decision.11 The recursive structure builds on a reduced
form equation for the potentially endogenous dummy return migration (RM∗
i ) and a struc-
tural form equation determining the outcome of interest namely entrepreneurship E∗
i .W e
adopt a recursive model in which return migration is assumed to inﬂuence the probability of
entrepreneurship: a dummy variable for temporary/return migration appears as a regressor
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0Hi + γRM + εi (24)
with








0Zi + μi (25)
with




where E[εi]=E[μi]=0 ,Va r[εi]=Va r[μi]=1 ,a n dCov[εi,μ i]=ρ.
Following the theoretical model, equation (24) shows that the probability of an individual
being an entrepreneur (business owner) Ei is a function of Xi, a vector of individual and
regional characteristics of individual i, his/her social network Si and his/her human capital
and savings Hi. It is also a function of whether the individual is a returnee (RM =1 )
or not (RM = 0 otherwise), i.e., the endogenous variable. The second equation estimates
the temporary/return migration decision, which is a function of Zi, a vector of explanatory
variables. These two decisions are treated as two interdependent decisions and ρ is the
coeﬃcient of correlation between the two error terms. A signiﬁcant ρ would support this
assumption of interdependence.
Although it is suﬃcient to have variation in the exogenous variables in both equations
to avoid identiﬁcation problems,12 this would rely heavily on the assumption of bivariate
normality. Thus, to avoid identiﬁcation by functional form, we impose exclusion restrictions
to improve identiﬁcation. We use the share of adult male migrants in the total adult male
population in the sub-district of origin of the individual in 2006 based on Census data. 13
As argued by Massey (1990) migration dynamics is a “cumulative causation” process, i.e.
past migrants in a community provides a resource to new migrants that lowers the costs
and risks associated with moving. Hence, current migration is a function of past migration
patterns. Thus using the rates for 2006 should reﬂect past migration patterns. In addition,
using migration prevalence rates for 2006 should ensure the plausibility of the exogeneity
restriction needed for the validity of this instrument. There is no threat that sub-district
level migration prevalence rates in 2006 are likely to be a factor determining the probability
12Wilde (2000) shows that exclusion restrictions are not needed provided there is one varying exogenous
regressor in each equation.
13We have had to rely on ﬁgures from 2006 Census for this variable. This question was not incluced in
previous censuses. This shouldn’t be a problem since diﬀerences in migration rates by district of origin have
been stable over time.
18of entrepreneurship in 1998. Individuals’ occupational choice and whether they set up a
business or not should not be aﬀected by the migration rates in the community, but by their
own migration experience and regional labor market conditions which we control for using
the share of self employed among total employed adult males by ”district” 14 and the share
of employers among total employed adult males by ”district” in 1996 using Census data. We
also include regional ﬁxed eﬀects to capture local labor market conditions.
The vector Xi includes individual characteristics. The individual characteristics are age,
marital status and education. Six educational dummies are used: no education (reference
group), read and write, less than intermediate, intermediate, higher than intermediate and
university education. Experience in the Egyptian labor marker measured in years and its
square to capture non-linearity are also used. Experience is calculated as the diﬀerence
between the year of the survey and year the individual entered the labor market for the
ﬁrst time, where for returnees also any time spent overseas is deducted. We also control for
whether an individual’s father was self-employed or employer when the individual was 15
of age which we envisage to have an eﬀect on the occupational choice of the individual and
thus might aﬀect his probability of becoming entrepreneur.
To capture the eﬀect of social capital/network, we use household size (which is a measure
of the size of the network Si in the theoretical model). In other words, the larger is the
household size, the bigger is the network size. We interact this variable with the returnee
dummy. We also control for potential loss of social capital by including the total number of
household members who migrated.15 We also capture the network Si by including whether
the individual lives in a village or a small town (with less than 20,000 inhabitants) relative
to living in cities, since people who live in smaller communities tend to know each other and
form closed-knit societies.16 In addition, we control for whether the returnee has been back
from overseas in the last year since we believe that if individuals lose their social capital
14The smallest administrative unit is shiakha (in urban areas) and village (in rural areas). We refer to
those as sub-district. “Qisms” (districts) are comprised of several shiakhas/villages.
15We also tried the proportion of the household members who migrated and a dummy for having had
migrated with other household members. Similar estimates were obtained.
16People in large cities, in comparison with people in small towns or rural areas, experience general
deﬁcits in the quality of interpersonal relations. This is the perspective of the so-called social disorganization
theory and the social capital literature (see e.g. Wirth, 1938, Coleman, 1988, and Putman, 1993, 2001).
Furthermore, urbanites are less likely than rural dwellers to base their personal networks on traditional
sources (such as family). This is the so-called subculture theory (see e.g. Fisher 1976, 1982).
19they would be unlikely to start a business in their ﬁrst year upon return, but we later also
check the robustness of our results by extending the period of return to the previous 2 years.
To capture the potential gain in human capital from overseas work, we include migration
duration in years (this corresponds to Hi in the theoretical model). We also control for
whether the entrepreneur who migrated have used personal savings to start up his business
(savings correspond to K in the theoretical model). Unfortunately we do not have data on
personal savings for entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs, only whether entrepreneurs have
used their savings to set up their businesses.
The vector Zi includes the individual characteristics such as age and educational level.
To control further for the migration decision, previous job characteristics, occupation and
residence are used. For migrants, those refer to the job characteristics (public sector), oc-
cupation and urban/rural region of residence prior to migration and for non-migrants these
refer to previous job/ residence if they have changed jobs/ residence before or current ones
if they have not. For a detailed description of the variables, see Table A1.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on entrepreneurs relative to non-entrepreneurs dis-
tinguishing between returnees and non-migrants. First, in terms of social network measures,
Table 2 shows that non-migrant entrepreneurs have on average bigger household size com-
pared to returnee entrepreneurs, but relative also to non-migrant non-entrepreneurs sug-
gesting a positive role for social network in entrepreneurship among non-migrants. Also
around 8 percent of returnee non-entrepreneurs had migrated with other family members
compared to 7 percent among returnee entrepreneurs. Moreover, a bigger proportion of en-
trepreneurs live in villages/small towns relative to non-entrepreneurs, but this proportion is
even bigger among returnee entrepreneurs relative to non-migrant entrepreneurs. The social
network measures provide preliminary support for the importance of social capital in en-
trepreneurship and show that returnee entrepreneurs having lower social capital relative to
non-migrant entrepreneurs. In addition, overseas migration might enhance human capital
captured by migration duration. Thus, on average, returnee entrepreneurs were overseas
for 5.4 years compared to 5.0 years among returnee non-entrepreneurs. Around 87 percent
of returnee entrepreneurs have used their savings to start-up their businesses. In terms of
individual characteristics, 15 percent of returnee entrepreneurs were self-employed before
migration compared to only 3 percent of returnee non-entrepreneurs. Almost 59 percent of
entrepreneurs among both returnees and non-migrants had a father who was self-employed or
20employer. Thus, the descriptive statistics indicate a potential trade oﬀ between social capital
on one hand and human and physical capital on the other hand as important determinants
of entrepreneurship.
[Insert Table 2 here]
5 Empirical ﬁndings
This section presents the results of the estimation of our empirical models, starting with
the simple binary probit estimation, followed by recursive bivariate probit results. First, as
a baseline comparison, we estimate a simple univariate probit of the probability of being
an entrepreneur (i.e., business owner) at the time of the survey and include a dummy for
being returnee but we do not control for the migration decision. The marginal eﬀects are
reported in Table 3. We ﬁnd that returnees are more likely than non-migrants (11%) to
become entrepreneurs.
[Insert Table 3 here]
Secondly we estimate a recursive bivariate probit model where the ﬁrst equation estimates
the probability of being an entrepreneur and the second equation estimates the probability
of being a returnee, where being a returnee is an endogenous regressor in the ﬁrst equation.
Table 3 displays the results. First, it is worth noting that the correlation coeﬃcient between
the probability of becoming an entrepreneur and being a returnee is signiﬁcant, indicating
that the error terms are interdependent, which is consistent with the theoretical model.
However, the correlation coeﬃcient is negative suggesting that unobservable characteristics
aﬀect those two decisions in opposite ways. For example, being a risk taker will not increase
both probabilities since it might increase the probability of entrepreneurship but not of return
migration, or it might be that entrepreneurs are less likely to become migrants because they
prefer non-waged work and migration to the Gulf States is mostly waged work. It is also
important to note that the exclusion restriction, migration prevalence rates in sub-district,
is signiﬁcant.
Table 4, Column 1 shows that controlling for the endogeneity of the migration decision,
we ﬁnd that a returnee is more likely to become an entrepreneur as compared to a stayer.
Our ﬁndings suggest that household size has a positive impact on the probability of being
entrepreneur, but not for returnees where this eﬀect is not signiﬁc a n t . T h i ss u g g e s t st h a t
21international migration may in fact dampens or weakens social capital at the country of
o r i g i n .T h i si sc o n ﬁrmed when looking at the impact of the number of household members
who migrated at the same time with the migrant, which has a negative impact on the prob-
ability of becoming an entrepreneur, although it is not statistically signiﬁcant. Furthermore,
although living in a village or a small town has a positive signiﬁcant eﬀect on becoming
an entrepreneur, this eﬀect is not signiﬁcant for returnees, suggesting again that migration
leads to a loss of social networks. Finally, having returned in the last year from overseas
has a negative eﬀect on the probability of being an entrepreneur, which might suggest that
returnees need time to rebuild their social networks upon return. On the other hand, the
eﬀect of migration duration is positive and signiﬁcant, suggesting that migration might en-
hance human capital. Finally,w ed i s e n t a n g l ea n o t h e re ﬀect by ﬁnding that savings or credit
matter for becoming an entrepreneur for returnees.
[Insert Table 4 here]
To check the robustness of our results, we conduct several checks in Table 5. First, in
column “5”, to capture labor market conditions, we use the information on the date of the
start of the business17 (as in Proposition 3 in the theoretical model). We ﬁnd that our
previous results are robust. In column “6”, we exclude those entrepreneurs who were self-
employed before migration and ﬁnd that our previous results hold and are not driven by
including those who were entrepreneurs before migration. In column “7”, we vary the length
since return by using 2 years instead of one and ﬁnd that returning in the last two years has
a negative, albeit not signiﬁcant, eﬀect on the probability of becoming an entrepreneur. We
then control for living in Greater Cairo and ﬁnd that this has negative signiﬁcant eﬀect for
non-migrants but an insigniﬁcant impact for returnees (column “8”), supporting our earlier
ﬁndings that social network has no signiﬁcant eﬀect for returnees. Finally, in column “9”,
to ensure that our results are not biased by few successful long term surviving ﬁrms, we
restrict our sample to businesses set up in the last 10-15 years and ﬁnd that the results are
unchanged.
[Insert Table 5 here]
Overall, our results suggest that social networks have no signiﬁcant impact on becoming
entrepreneurs for returnees but matter for non-migrants.W e a l s o ﬁnd that human capital
17Exact date of start up of businesses is available for those started between 1990-98.
22and savings matter for becoming entrepreneur for returnees. The joint probability of being
a returnee and entrepreneur is around 19 percent and only 14 percent for being a non-
migrant and an entrepreneur. Interestingly, conditional on being a returnee, the probability
of becoming an entrepreneur is almost 50 percent. This suggests that one needs to control
for the endogeneity of temporary migration when studying the entrepreneurship decision.
[Insert Table 6 here]
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper examines an important question for developing countries, namely what factors
aﬀect entrepreneurship. We focus on the case of return migrants and develop a theoretical
search model that puts forward the trade oﬀ faced by returnees since overseas migration
provides an opportunity for human and physical capital accumulation but, at the same
time, may lead to a loss of social capital back home. We test the predictions of the model
using Egyptian data and ﬁnd that, controlling for the endogeneity of temporary migration,
an overseas returnee is more likely to become an entrepreneur than a non-migrant. Our
results also suggest that social networks increase the probability of entrepreneurship for
non-migrants but have no signiﬁcant impact for returnees. We also ﬁnd that human capital
and savings aﬀect the likelihood for returnees of becoming entrepreneurs. Interestingly, the
ﬁndings also indicate that although return migration and entrepreneurship are correlated,
there might be a trade oﬀ between those two decisions.
This paper sheds light on a very important policy issue for developing countries. The
paper shows how entrepreneurship depends on social networks, human capital and access
to credit. Although migrants may potentially lose their social capital, their accumulated
savings and experience overseas over-compensate for their loss. This, in a way, emphasizes
the importance of access to credit as a major obstacle facing entrepreneurs in developing
countries. Thus, policies focusing on access to credit is paramount for investment and thus
for economic growth and development.
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26Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . First, observe that to determine which individual has the
highest probability to become entrepreneur, we have to check the following condition:
e tre R e tnm (26)







We know that SnmHre − SreHnm > 0a n dHre − Hnm > 0 so this inequality can go in both
directions.






where ∆H = Hre







= Snm (∆H − 1) − (Snm∆H − Sre)
= Sre − Snm < 0
As a result, for a given
IU+K
IV , Snm and Sre, the left-hand side of (27) is decreasing in ∆H.
Thus the higher is ∆H, the higher is the diﬀerence in human capital between returnees and
non-migrants, the more likely a returnee is an entrepreneur, i.e. e tre < e tnm.















which means the lower Snm and/or the higher Sre, the more likely a returnee is an entrepre-
neur, i.e. e tre < e tnm.















































































































































Table 1: Sample Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Returnees Non-Migrants 
  Mean  Std Dev  Mean  Std Dev 
Individual Characteristics       
Entrepreneur (%)  35.43  47.90  30.44  46.02 
Age (years)  42.99 7.86  45.65  10.39 
Married (%)  96.57  18.22  95.66  20.37 
 
Educational level (%) 
  
  
None  14.00 34.75  25.28  43.47 
Read & write  9.14  28.86  14.78  35.50 
Less than intermediate  15.71  36.45  18.71  39.01 
Intermediate 31.14  46.37  18.46  38.80 
Higher than intermediate  6.29  24.31  6.18  24.09 
University   23.71  42.59  16.59  37.20 
 
Previous Work/Residence Characteristics (%) 
Urban resident: Previous  65.71  47.53  67.75  46.75 
Waged worker : Previous  21.71  41.29  38.39  48.64 
Public sector worker: Previous  7.14  25.79  5.63  23.06 
 
Previous Occupation dummies (%) 
Technical & scientific: Previous  18.86  39.17  17.41  37.92 
Management : Previous  0.57  7.55  2.22  14.72 
Clerical: Previous  6.29  24.31  9.91  29.88 
Sales: Previous  6.00  23.78  9.81  29.75 
Services: Previous  4.86  21.53  6.99  25.51 
Agriculture: Previous  10.86  31.15  20.57  40.43 
Production: Previous  25.43  43.61  30.19  45.92 
 
Regions of Residence in 1998 (%) 
Greater Cairo  19.71  39.84  20.60  40.45 
Alex & Canal Cities  13.71  34.45  13.32  33.99 
Lower Urban  17.43  37.99  16.46  37.08 
Upper Urban  14.57  35.33  17.15  37.70 
Lower Rural  22.29  41.68  19.40  39.55 

















Table 2: Data Statistics of Entrepreneurs and Non-Entrepreneurs 
 Entrepreneurs  Non-Entrepreneurs 
Variable Returnee  Non-Migrants Returnee  Non-Migrants 
  Mean  S.D.  Mean S.D. Mean S.D.  Mean  S.D. 
Individual Characteristics 
Age (%)  43.03  7.89  46.15  9.78  42.97  7.87  45.43  10.64 
Married (%)  97.58  15.43  96.15 19.24 96.02 19.60  95.45 20.84 
LM experience in Egypt (years)  20.12  10.90  30.94  12.23  19.54  10.56  27.96  12.64 
Self-employed bef. migration (%)  14.52  35.37      3.10  17.36     
Father: self-empl/ employer (%)  58.87  49.41  59.04  49.20  31.86  46.70  34.17  47.44 
 
Educational level: (%) 
None  16.94  37.66  32.26 46.77 12.39 33.02  22.22 41.58 
Read  &  write  10.48  30.76  17.69 38.18  8.41 27.81  13.50 34.18 
<  than  intermediate  15.32  36.17  19.46 39.61 15.93 36.68  18.39 38.75 
Intermediate  30.65  46.29  13.74 34.44 31.42 46.52  20.53 40.40 
>  than intermediate  6.45  24.67  4.16  19.98  6.19  24.16  7.07  25.64 
University    20.16  40.28  12.70 33.31 25.66 43.77  18.29 38.67 
 
Social Network 
Household  size  5.37  1.97  5.94 2.60  5.31 1.96  5.19 2.16 
Family  migrated  (%)  7.26  26.05     7.96  28.73    
Live in village/small town  47.58  50.14  44.49  49.72  39.38  48.97  34.85  47.66 
Returned in last year  3.23  17.74      4.87  21.57     
Returned in last 2 years  5.65  23.17      8.41  27.81     
 
Migration Characteristics 
Migration duration (years)  5.35  5.03      5.02  4.85     
 
Savings    
        
Migrant used savings (%)  87.10  33.66           
 
District Characteristics 
Share  of  Migrants  1.62  1.28  1.33 1.24  1.29 1.00  1.17 1.17 
Share of Self employed   18.52  10.91  19.39  10.83  18.08  10.51  18.03  9.88 
Share  of  employer  7.65  6.21  7.69 8.95  8.34 7.75  7.06 7.25 
 
Regions (%) 
           












Table 3: Probability of being Entrepreneur 
  Marginal Effects 
Returnee 0.111 
 (3.86)** 
Individual Characteristics   
LM experience in Egypt  0.008 
 (2.75)** 






Educational level ( ref. group: none)   
Read & write  -0.006 
 (0.23) 




Higher than intermediate   -0.075 
 (1.92) 
University   -0.035 
 (1.07) 
 






3503                                      
Pseudo R2     0.0332 
Log Pseudo likelihood  -2095.9211                        
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses. Regional dummies included. 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
  
Table 4: Bivariate Probit Estimates: Probability of being an Entrepreneur and Probability of being a 
Returnee 
 1  2  3  4 
Probability of being Entrepreneur        
Returnee 1.459  1.390  1.396  0.476 
 (9.17)**  (4.43)**  (4.33)**  (1.03) 
Social Network        
Household size    0.055  0.054  0.053 
   (4.87)**  (4.63)**  (4.61)** 
Household size*returnee    -0.071  -0.077  -0.051 
   (1.98)*  (2.11)*  (0.91) 
Family migrated     -0.054  -0.004  -0.196 
   (0.30)  (0.02)  (0.84) 
Lives in village/small town    0.181  0.153  0.146 
   (3.38)**  (2.82)**  (2.69)** 
Lives in  vil/small town * returnee    0.005  -0.000  -0.056 
   (0.03)  (0.00)  (0.23) 
Returned in last year    -0.248  -0.271  -6.716 
   (0.65)  (0.70)  (14.12)** 
Human Capital        
Migration duration    0.033  0.036  0.034 
   (2.19)*  (2.36)*  (1.44) 
Physical Capital        
Migrant used savings        0.032 
       (24.57)** 
District Characteristics        
Share of Self employed     0.444  0.338  0.406 
   (1.69)  (1.27)  (1.47) 
Share of employer    0.265  0.130  0.281 
   (0.83)  (0.40)  (0.85) 
Individual Characteristics        
Father: self-empl/ employer      0.592  0.584 
     (12.00)**  (11.57)** 
Self-empl. before migration    1.346  1.286  1.265 
   (11.84)**  (11.02)**  (10.54)** 
LM experience in Egypt  0.026  0.026  0.026  0.026 
 (3.27)**  (2.98)**  (2.82)**  (2.81)** 
LM exp in Egypt Sq.  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
 (1.27)  (0.57)  (0.68)  (0.68) 
Age -0.015  -0.022  -0.023  -0.023 
 (2.92)**  (3.88)**  (3.89)**  (3.93)** 
Educational level ( ref. group: none)      
Read & write  -0.058  0.056  0.025  0.024 
 (0.80)  (0.71)  (0.32)  (0.30) 
Less than intermediate  -0.164  0.022  -0.005  0.015 
 (2.31)*  (0.29)  (0.06)  (0.18) 
Intermediate -0.409  -0.156  -0.235  -0.255 
 (5.00)**  (1.70)  (2.51)*  (2.65)** 
Higher than intermediate   -0.344  -0.068  -0.141  -0.199 
 (3.05)**  (0.56)  (1.13)  (1.50) 
University   -0.306  0.009  -0.046  -0.003 
 (3.34)**  (0.09)  (0.44)  (0.03) 
Married 0.025  -0.056  -0.093  -0.086 
 (0.23)  (0.48)  (0.76)  (0.69) 
Constant -0.362  -0.770  -0.845  -0.861 
 (2.01)*  (3.72)**  (3.99)**  (4.04)**  
 
 1  2  3  4 
 
Probability of being Returnee 
      
Share of Migrants  0.094  0.085  0.085  0.081 
 (3.93)**  (3.44)**  (3.44)**  (3.32)** 
Individual Characteristics        
Age 0.005  0.004  0.004  0.004 
 (1.78)  (1.33)  (1.28)  (1.24) 
Educational level ( ref. group: none) 
Read & write  0.193  0.146  0.132  0.125 
 (1.66)  (1.23)  (1.11)  (1.05) 
Less than intermediate  0.365  0.284  0.275  0.282 
 (3.49)**  (2.60)**  (2.53)*  (2.58)** 
Intermediate 0.800  0.718  0.702  0.679 
 (6.87)**  (5.87)**  (5.80)**  (5.71)** 
Higher than intermediate   0.558  0.433  0.417  0.367 
 (3.22)**  (2.41)*  (2.33)*  (2.12)* 
University   0.720  0.572  0.558  0.550 
 (5.17)**  (3.92)**  (3.86)**  (3.85)** 
Previous Employment Characteristics 
Public sector worker: Previous  -0.905  -0.900  -0.893  -0.887 
 (11.17)**  (10.45)**  (10.36)**  (10.24)** 
Urban resident: previous  -0.136  -0.110  -0.110  -0.109 
 (1.96)  (1.49)  (1.48)  (1.46) 
 
Previous Occupation dummies ( ref: technical, & scientific) 
Management: Previous  -0.982  -1.008  -1.018  -1.067 
 (3.18)**  (3.19)**  (3.25)**  (3.42)** 
Clerical: Previous  -0.565  -0.593  -0.599  -0.618 
 (4.48)**  (4.46)**  (4.50)**  (4.63)** 
Sales: Previous  -0.533  -0.686  -0.721  -0.739 
 (3.35)**  (4.01)**  (4.33)**  (4.67)** 
Services: Previous  -0.466  -0.545  -0.542  -0.582 
 (2.96)**  (3.37)**  (3.31)**  (3.69)** 
Agriculture: Previous  -0.608  -0.759  -0.776  -0.804 
 (4.23)**  (4.94)**  (5.09)**  (5.67)** 
Production: Previous  -0.512  -0.581  -0.578  -0.604 
 (4.82)**  (5.21)**  (5.13)**  (5.58)** 
Constant -1.304  -1.123  -1.103  -1.064 
 (6.39)**  (5.24)**  (5.15)**  (5.19)** 
Rho -0.64  -0.49  -0.48  -0.55 
Wald test of rho=0:         chi2(1) =    33.80  12.76  11.37  17.04 
Sample size   3387  3185  3185  3185 
Log Pseudo likelihood  -3001.62  -2713.08  -2637.29  -2500.20 
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
Regional dummies included.  
Table 5: Further Sensitivity Analysis: Bivariate Probit Estimates:  
Probability of being an Entrepreneur  
  5  6  7 8 9 
Returnee  1.312  1.452  1.393 1.366 0.976 




       
Household  size  0.058  0.055  0.054 0.050 0.089 
  (4.85)**  (4.87)**  (4.65)** (4.31)** (4.88)** 
Household  size*returnee  -0.077  -0.089  -0.076 -0.076 -0.097 
 (2.03)*  (2.41)*  (2.07)*  (2.10)*  (1.61) 
Family migrated  -0.040  -0.016  -0.003  0.019  0.128 
  (0.21)  (0.09)  (0.02) (0.10) (0.56) 
Live in rural areas  0.159  0.140  0.153 0.138 0.105 
 (2.84)**  (2.63)**  (2.81)**  (2.52)*  (1.40) 
Live in village/small town* returnee -0.029 0.027  -0.006  0.012  0.024 
 (0.19)  (0.18)  (0.04)  (0.08)   
Live in Greater Cairo        -0.180   
       (2.51)*   
Live in Greater Cairo* returnee        0.081   
       (0.40)  
Returned in last year  -0.226  -0.120    -0.266   
  (0.58)  (0.33)   (0.69)  
Returned in last 2 years      -0.257     
     (0.87)     
 
Human Capital 
       
Migration duration   0.033  0.037  0.037  0.038  0.027 
 (2.07)*  (2.33)*  (2.38)*  (2.35)*  (1.08) 
 
Physical Capital 
       
Migrant used savings         0.031 
         (21.69)** 
 









Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses. . 
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
Those are the estimates from the first equation in the bivariate probit model. Only selected variables are shown.  
Model 5 includes dummies for date of start of business. Model 6 excludes those who were self-employed before 
migration. Model 7 uses 2 years since return dummy. Model 8 includes Greater Cairo. Model 9 includes 
businesses started after 1985 (sample size is 1738).  
Table A1: Data Appendix 
Variable Definition 
Individual Characteristics   
Age  Age in years at the time of survey 
Married  Martial Status at the time of survey 
LM experience in Egypt  Years of experience in the Egyptian labor market. 
LM experience in Egypt Sq  Years of experience in the Egyptian labor market squared 
Father: self-empl/ employer  =1 if the individual’s father was self employed or employer when the 
individual was aged 15 years of age. 
 
Educational level 
None  =1 if the individual has no education  
Read & write  =1 if the individual can read and write  
Less than intermediate  =1 if the individual has less than intermediate education (6 years). 
Intermediate  =1 if the individual has intermediate education (9 years) 
Higher than intermediate  =1 if the individual has higher than intermediate educ. (12 years) 
University   =1 if the individual has university education (16 yrs of education). 
 
Social Network 
Household size  Household size at the time of survey 
Household size*returnee  Household size interacted with returnee 
Family migrated  Household members migrated with the migrant head 
Live in village/small town  =1 if individual lives in a village or town with less than 20,000 inhabitants 
Live in vil/small town* returnee  =1 if returnee lives in a village or town with < than 20,000 inhabitants  
Returned in last year  =1 if the individual returned from overseas in the last year  
Returned in last 2 years  =1 if the individual returned from overseas in the last 2 years  
 
Migration Characteristics 
Migration duration   Migration duration in years 
Migrant used savings  Migrants used savings to start-up business  
 
District Characteristics  
Share of Migrants  Share of adult male migrants among adult males in sub-district 
(skiakha/village)  
Share of Self employed   Share of self employed among total employed adult males in district (qism) 
Share of Employer  Share of employer among total employed adult males in district (qism) 
 
Previous Work/Residence Characteristics 
Urban resident: Previous  Previous residence: urban dummy 
Public sector worker: Previous  Previous sector of employment: public sector dummy 
Self-empl. before migration   Self-employed before migration & returnee dummy 
 
Previous Occupation dummies  
Technical & scientific: Previous  Previous occupation: Technical & Scientific dummy 
Management: Previous  Previous occupation: Management dummy 
Clerical: Previous  Previous occupation: clerical dummy 
Sales: Previous  Previous occupation: sales dummy 
Services: Previous  Previous occupation: services dummy 
Agriculture: Previous  Previous occupation: agriculture dummy 
Production: Previous  Previous occupation: production dummy 




=1 if the individual is an employer or self employed owner of non-
agricultural economic unit 
Returnee  =1 if the individual is a return international migrant 
 